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-   -   Ethiopian B38M Crash (http://www.yssyforum.net/board/showthread.php?t=11999)

Brian Noldt 10th March 2019 08:09 PM

Ethiopian B38M Crash
 
An Ethiopian B737-8 MAX has crashed six minutes after taking off from Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, on a flight to Nairobi.
There were 149 passengers and a crew of 8

From The Aviation Herald:
http://avherald.com/h?article=4c534c4a&opt=0

Brian Noldt 10th March 2019 11:00 PM

An update, there are no survivors

Philip Argy 11th March 2019 06:59 AM

B38 MAX awful co-incidence?
 
Crashing shortly after take-off is not a welcome trend after two high profile 737-800 MAX events.

It is obviously too early to form any conclusions but two is too many and there does need to be some focus on what Boeing did to create the MAX that may be an underlying factor in these crashes.

The parallels with Lion Air 610 are too much of a co-incidence to ignore.
:(

Greg Hyde 11th March 2019 01:53 PM

Latest news incl "New Flight Control Features"

https://www.news.com.au/travel/trave...d63c57bcee657f

Brian Noldt 11th March 2019 02:47 PM

Due to the Ethiopia Airlines B737 MAX 8 crash, Boeing postpones the launch of the 777X which was due to take place later this week.

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/10/b...ned/index.html

MarkR 11th March 2019 08:02 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Greg Hyde (Post 107410)
Latest news incl "New Flight Control Features"

https://www.news.com.au/travel/trave...d63c57bcee657f

I would not say anything on news.com is actually news, after all their latest article states “aussies upmost confidence in Boeing” complete with a picture of an A330.......

Arthur T 11th March 2019 08:40 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Philip Argy (Post 107407)
Crashing shortly after take-off is not a welcome trend after two high profile 737-800 MAX events.

It is obviously too early to form any conclusions but two is too many and there does need to be some focus on what Boeing did to create the MAX that may be an underlying factor in these crashes.

The parallels with Lion Air 610 are too much of a co-incidence to ignore.
:(

I do not want to draw any conclusion however, as you mentioned:

"The parallels with Lion Air 610 are too much of a co-incidence to ignore."

I thought about some possible short term measures to regain the passengers' confidence on this type of aircraft without grounding them all:

1. Immediately disable MCAS on all B737 Max series jets.
2. Where possible, disable autopilot for all B737 Max Jets whilst airborne.

Radi K 12th March 2019 12:59 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Arthur T (Post 107413)
1. Immediately disable MCAS on all B737 Max series jets.
2. Where possible, disable autopilot for all B737 Max Jets whilst airborne.

The MCAS system is required for type certification so it's unlikely that will be "disabled"

As for No 2 - MCAS was an issue in Lion Air with the autopilot already disengaged. So it's not an autopilot problem.

There was an excellent NYT article on the topic last month: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/w...sh-pilots.html

Erik H. Bakke 12th March 2019 11:46 AM

The solution to that is simple, unfortunately: Suspend the type certificate.

I just don't understand how the airlines can actually CHOOSE to continue to fly the type, let alone being allowed to, as long as there is such a doubt over such a critical system.

Are these the same airlines that like saying "Safety always comes first"?

Wasn't the world fleet of 787s grounded for a while, during the battery fire issues? Why should the 737 MAX fleet be any different?
And it is better to do that now, while the fleet is still fairly small (relatively speaking).

I know that I as a passenger is now making conscious choices not to fly on the MAX series until the root cause has not just been identified but also confirmed fixed.
That is the same choice I made about the 787 back in the day.

Philip Argy 12th March 2019 12:26 PM

Boeing to modify MCAS software
 
Quote:

Boeing Co confirmed late on Monday it will deploy a software upgrade to the 737 MAX 8, a few hours after the Federal Aviation Administration said it would mandate "design changes" in the aircraft by April.

[-snip-]

The company said in the aftermath of October's Lion Air Flight crash it has for several months "been developing a flight control software enhancement for the 737 MAX, designed to make an already safe aircraft even safer." The software upgrade "will be deployed across the 737 MAX fleet in the coming weeks," it said.
So there you have it, from the horse's mouth

MarkR 12th March 2019 03:26 PM

Singapore have now stopped Max ops, which affects the Silk Air operations into Oz.

https://www.straitstimes.com/singapo...ay-morning-sia

Rowan McKeever 12th March 2019 06:34 PM

ABC News published an article a few minutes ago saying CASA has suspended all MAX8 operations in Australia (in practice only affecting Fiji Airways as other MAX operators were already affected by their own countries’ regulators).

https://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2019-...ralia/10894426

Brian Noldt 13th March 2019 05:49 AM

Further to Rowan’s post,

Heard on 2GB this morning, Fiji’s 737-MAX will be allowed to fly out of Sydney but with no passengers

The UK have banned the 737-MAX flying in and out of the UK forcing two Turkish Airline flights to turn around and return to their point of departure.

The EU is also suspending all operations of the 737-MAX in Europe

https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-n...ash/index.html

Rowan McKeever 13th March 2019 06:54 AM

Pleased to hear FJ will be allowed to ferry theirs out of SYD - lousy timing for the announcement by CASA, which could have been prevented with a simple check of what two aircraft were scheduled to do.

In addition to the UK and Europe overnight, India has also banned the MAX. As most of the bans appear to include overflight, it seems like the MAX fleet will be restricted to flying within North America (although FJ might still be able to find things to do with theirs - NZ and Hawaii, for example).

Andrew P 13th March 2019 04:24 PM

Will play devil's advocate, I wonder if the White House has any input into the FAA decision.

MarkR 13th March 2019 05:52 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rowan McKeever (Post 107434)
As most of the bans appear to include overflight, it seems like the MAX fleet will be restricted to flying within North America (although FJ might still be able to find things to do with theirs - NZ and Hawaii, for example).

NZ are now banning Max flights, so that option has pretty much gone.

Brian Noldt 14th March 2019 06:11 AM

The United States and Canada have now grounded all 737-MAX aircraft. President Trump has issued the executive order. Any aircraft currenent in flight will be allowed to go to its destination but then will be grounded.

https://www.news.com.au/travel/trave...4c6053f4b55bea

Philip Argy 14th March 2019 10:53 AM

Boeing itself now supports grounding of all MAX variants
 
Just issued:

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130404

Worth reading in conjunction with this one from last Monday:

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-re...ts?item=130402

Philip Argy 15th March 2019 06:50 AM

Dire prognosis for Boeing
 
Simon Gunson has published a dire prognostication: the end of Boeing!

https://www.quora.com/profile/Simon-Gunson

Basically he claims that the entire internal communications protocol of the MAX is flawed because it is inherently susceptible to voltage fluctuations which cause data corruption in vital avionics components. From that he concludes that it is not economically feasible for Boeing to rectify the problem!

David C 15th March 2019 07:37 AM

Who is this Simon Gunston ? , and how is he qualified to make statements regarding the digital architecture of the 737 Max aircraft .
His disclosures are full of mays, could, should , if and might. There absolutely nothing indicative in what he says . If he’s such an expert , then Boeing should snap him up , he obviously knows all the answers . There’s also no credit given or sources for his information , and on top of all this , he’s seem privy to the Boeing financial status . There certainly no shortage of armchair avionics experts and air crash investigators out there .

MarkR 15th March 2019 10:00 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Philip Argy (Post 107442)
Simon Gunson has published a dire prognostication: the end of Boeing!

LOL, quoting a random on the internet as an expert.

Philip Argy 16th March 2019 04:21 PM

What expert?
 
I certainly didn't cite Gunson as an expert. I was holding his prognostication up to ridicule, as indicated by the exclamation marks!!!!

David C 17th March 2019 07:43 AM

Philip ,there’s certainly no intent in my post to suggest you did cite Gunson as some kind of expert , which obviously he isn’t . No offence intended .

Phil Stevens 17th March 2019 07:46 PM

FR24 has a listing of where all 737MAX are currently parked up.

Greg Hyde 18th March 2019 11:23 AM

Ethiopia's Boeing 737 MAX 8 black box data 'shows clear similarities' with Lion Air crash

Analysis of the data from the black boxes of an Ethiopian Airlines plane that crashed, killing all 157 people on board, showed "clear similarities" with an earlier crash of the same jet model, a spokesperson for the Ethiopian Transport Ministry has confirmed.

However, US officials have told Reuters they had not yet validated the data, emphasising "the investigation remains in the very early stages".

In October, a Lion Air crash killed all 189 people onboard, after pilots fought against the jet's automated nose dive.

Both planes were Boeing's top-selling jet model, the 737 MAX 8, and pilots in both crashes reported flight control problems during take-off.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-...crash/10910460

Andrew P 18th March 2019 12:09 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Andrew P (Post 107436)
Will play devil's advocate, I wonder if the White House has any input into the FAA decision.

close call

https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-a...17-p514w0.html

Brenden S 18th March 2019 03:13 PM

Food for thought people.....

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...iwr7R6oPKFFXl0

Rowan McKeever 18th March 2019 06:43 PM

Sure is. Those bullet points, assuming there’s any truth to them, are worrying.

I’m not convinced by Boeing’s proposed software fix. Admittedly I’m neither a pilot nor an avionics engineer, but I don’t understand how simply having both AOA sensors provide data to the MCAS resolves the problem, particularly as an AOA sensor fault is being discussed in terms of Lion Air...

I, personally, was siding with “it’s safe but a grounding is the most appropriate course of action” until the last few days. Now, I’m beginning to think the sign off for the MAX to return to service needs to come from EASA or TC, or another similarly independent regulator. I think the industry and the public, and confidence in this aircraft type, would be better served by not allowing Boeing and the FAA to have that level of authority.

Rowan McKeever 20th March 2019 03:30 PM

Both the EASA and Transport Canada have said they will conduct their own independent certification process on the MAX prior to return to service in their jurisdictions, rather than relying on the FAA process again. Reportedly both the Inspector General and the Department of Justice will review the FAA/Boeing certification processes.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47633085

Philip Argy 28th March 2019 06:40 PM

Boeing to preview "fix"
 
Here's the latest: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/27/boei...aboolainternal

Greg Hyde 5th April 2019 11:35 AM

On the midday news, ET crew reported followed SOP (from Boeing) for MCAS issue.

Philip Argy 5th April 2019 12:14 PM

Bad software
 
As I understand it, MCAS was limited to 2.5 degrees of horizontal stabiliser deflection, which in theory could be overcome by manual nose-up input from the pilots. However, Boeing's SOP, which recommended deactivating the MCAS, did not explain that such a procedure just reset it rather than disabled it. If the same faulty AOA input recurred MCAS would then deflect the stabiliser up to 2.5 degrees. But here's the fatal flaw: it had no "memory" of previous deflections after each reset, and it had no provision for checking the current deflection, so each activation of MCAS ADDED ANOTHER 2.5 DEGREES of nose-down!!

That explains why both Lion Air and EA appeared to porpoise - manually regaining climb after the first deactivation but increasingly unable to do so as the jackscrew added each incremental 2.5 degrees of MCAS-commanded nose-down to its existing setting until the horizontal stabiliser was beyond the pilots' ability to counter with elevator nose-up commands. What is shocking is both the flaw in the software and Boeing's deliberate decision to withhold full information about MCAS so that they could market MAX as a no-conversion option for existing B738 pilots. As is now apparent, no B738 simulator incorporated MCAS and no pilot was aware how to fully disable MCAS to avoid it continually re-activating, assuming they would even appreciate the need to do so given the limits of the SOP Boeing had provided.

If my theory is confirmed by the investigation team Boeing's civil liability may be the least of its problems ... :(

Philip Argy 5th April 2019 01:52 PM

EA preliminary report just released
 
http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/204...8-d7af1ee17f3e

The key finding from the FDR, is that this occurred AFTER the electric stabiliser trim cutout switches had been pulled:

Quote:

At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
So automatic nose down trim commands were issued by MCAS and honoured despite the stabiliser trim cutout switches having been pulled. Boeing's only suggestion in that situation is to manually grab the trim wheel to stop it from rotating. Obviously if it's already at 40 degrees nose down grabbing the trim wheel is not going to help much.

Martin Buzzell 8th April 2019 07:30 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Philip Argy (Post 107549)
http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/204...8-d7af1ee17f3e

40 degrees nose down grabbing the trim wheel is not going to help much.

Didn't they turn the trim switches back on?

David Knudsen 10th April 2019 02:30 PM

Happy to stand corrected, but the way I understand it was that they were unable to exert enough force on the manual trim wheel (due to the airspeed) and reactivated the trim cutout switches.

Quote:

At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out "stab trim cut-out" two times. Captain agreed and First-Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out.

At 05:40:41, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a third instance of AND automatic trim command occurred without any corresponding motion of the stabilizer, which is consistent with the stabilizer trim cutout switches were in the "cutout" position
So that indicates with the switches in the cutout position, MCAS continues to operate but cannot move the stabiliser as the cutout switches de-energise the motor?

Quote:

At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
I assume the FO is confirming the manual electric trim is not functioning, consistent with the switches being in cutout, so tries the manual trim wheel without success (Due to aerodynamic forces of the aircraft being above VMO??)

Then;
Quote:

At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,400 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.

At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
So at some point between 05:41:54 and 05:43:11 the trim cutout switches must have been reactivated for the manual electric trim inputs to move the stab in the ANU direction - which explains why MCAS suddenly had the ability to command AND movements again?

MarkR 23rd April 2019 03:29 PM

Interesting comment on the investigations to date:

Quote:

Examining both accidents separately provides valuable insights—it’s easy to understand how these unrelated airlines and crew may have responded in similar ways—but the overall conclusion in our previous article, “Boeing’s Grounding: Catastrophic Crashes, and Questions About Boeing’s Liability And 737 MAX Aircraft Viability,” still stands—the major contributing factor to these accidents was pilot error.

After a more comprehensive analysis of each of the two accidents, especially Lion Air Flight 610, we are persuaded more than ever that the case for pilot error—as well as inadequate training—are the dominant contributing factors in both accidents, not the only ones but the most serious factors.
https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/3...se-pilot-error

Philip Argy 23rd April 2019 04:15 PM

Pilot error claim objectively unfair
 
The fact is that Boeing promoted the MAX as requiring little to no conversion training from a 737-800 - an hour on an iPad was one quote I saw. In that context any inability of crew to cope with differences with which they were not familiar, and which had never been incorporated into any simulator, cannot be the principal cause of either event. Pilot error based on informed hindsight has no place here.

Having said that, yes, I have speculated more than I should have about the role of MCAS, but the inferences are there to be drawn.

Adrian B 30th April 2019 11:29 AM

Looks like Boeing have decided to put the accidents back on the pilots:

Boeing CEO Points at pilot error

Philip Argy 30th April 2019 12:17 PM

Primitive inputs need more redundancy and resilience
 
However sophisticated the avionics, the old adage of garbage in garbage out applies. Primitive physical sources like pitot tubes and AofA sensors need redundancy and resilience before they are taken as trusted sources for sophisticated avionics. Taking a single sensor as a trusted source was objectively poor risk management in the implementation of MCAS.

There have been too many examples of erroneous data from pitot tubes and AofA sensors causing adverse avionics responses. This needs much more focus going forward IMHO.

Blaming pilots is hardly helpful - human error needs to be anticipated in system design. It's no use if the cure is worse than the complaint. Pilots know what to do when the stick shakes. MCAS is not necessarily the best solution to the MAX propensity to stall!

:(

Philip Argy 3rd May 2019 09:13 AM

As I was saying ...
 
How dare they blame the pilots!

Now this: https://airlinerwatch.com/boeing-nev...sources-claim/

My case rests ...


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