#11
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Funny, I know three other people who also wrote similar comments, plus mine, and surprise surprise, none of them were published.................
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#12
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Quote:
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#13
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Qantas was once a great airline but now that all the maintenance is done offshore the airlines safety has slipped and they always have serious problems. I will never fly this airline again they are unsafe and a disaster waiting to happen! We would get published!!!!!!!!!
__________________
..... up up and away with TAA |
#14
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Funny and straight to the point good on yah Greg
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#15
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Marty, have you done any study in human factors at all? The article made a bold statement that "it was something to do with the pilot" and you simply dismiss it as "pilot error".
Accidents happen because of a chain of events all lining up and this accident was a classic example. Have a read of the accident report and enlighten yourself - http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...904538_001.pdf |
#16
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Quote:
officer to go around. As the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircraft’s mainwheels touched down (1,002 m along the 3,150 m runway, 636 m beyond the ideal touchdown point). The captain immediately cancelled the go-around by retarding the thrust levers, without announcing his actions. Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other pilots, and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll. Due to a variety of factors associated with the cancellation of the go-around, the aircraft’s speed did not decrease below the touchdown speed (154 kts) until the aircraft was 1,625 m or halfway down the runway. If that isnt pilot error I dont know what is. |
#17
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Sounds more like a CRM issue to me. As for the story, I wonder which disgruntled QF employee is feeding this stuff to the media. I am sure that this increased media attention is the product of an employee who is not happy with QF's outsourcing of maintenance.
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