Emirates B773 Burns On Landing

[Rowan McKeever]

I'm sure the airline's liability would be diminished, Mark. In this particular instance, there is one video on youtube in which you can clearly hear a FA repeatedly yelling "leave everything behind, get out", and I'd be very surprised if a court didn't find that some or all of the airline's liability is discharged as a result.

I'm less sure how the airline, regulators, etc. would actually go about laying charges against pax who essentially compromise an evacuation to take their belongings (or, for that matter, don't remove high-heeled shoes). What I can say is that, in Australia, "disobeying a lawful direction from a member of the crew" (or words to that effect) is a federal offence and, therefore, no jurisdictional issue... it would fall under CASA's remit and they would refer to the AFP.

I completely agree with everything others have said that there are many factors which 'make' people stop to gather their belongings... culture, panic, heat of the moment, the works. Something needs to be done about it, though, before it does cost someone their life, assuming it hasn't already.

[Radi K]

I'm not one to defend what happened but I will comment that if every single time you leave and aircraft you take your bag with you, in an emergency you go into autopilot mode in a sense and your brain just does what it's used to. There has been talk of auto-locking overhead lockers for dep/arr. I think there are some ideas to be explored.

Still, BA, Asiana and this, all impacts close to the ground and in all cases everyone survived the impact! Solid jet.

[Robert.M]

Originally Posted by Radi K

There has been talk of auto-locking overhead lockers for dep/arr.

Though cost will likely win out. Most airlines will not do it unless they have been mandated. This also doesn't address carry-on that is placed under the seat.

[MarkR]

Some interesting opinion in today's OZ, which has a number of aviation stories, and remarkably well written IMHO.

The crash of an Emirates B777 during an attempted go-around in Dubai last Wednesday was always an accident waiting to happen.

It was not the fault of the pilots, the airline or Boeing, because this accident could have happened to any pilot in any airline flying any modern glass cockpit airliner — Airbus, Boeing or Bombardier — or a large corporate jet with autothrottle.

It is the result of the imperfect interaction of the pilots with supposedly failsafe automatics, which pilots are rigorously trained to trust, which in this case failed them.

First, let us be clear about the effect of hot weather on the day. All twin-engine jet aircraft are certified at maximum takeoff weight to climb away on one engine after engine failure on takeoff at the maximum flight envelope operating temperature — 50 degrees C in the case of a B777 — to reach a regulatory climb gradient minimum of 2.4 per cent.

The Emirates B777-300 was operating on two engines and at a lower landing weight, so climb performance should not have been a problem. I have operated for years out of Dubai in summer, where the temperature is often in the high 40s, in both widebody Airbus and Boeing B777 aircraft.

Secondly, a pilot colleague observed exactly what happened as he was there, waiting in his aircraft to cross runway 12L. The B777 bounced and began a go-around. The aircraft reached about 150 feet (45 metres) with its landing gear retracting, then began to sink to the runway.

This suggests that the pilots had initiated a go-around as they had been trained to do and had practised hundreds of times in simulators, but the engines failed to respond in time to the pilot-commanded thrust. Why?

Read more at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opin...bc4e1e4b08665a

(And enjoy the readers comments )

[Nigel C]

Subscriber-only article unfortunately.

[Kent Broadhead]

His theory is that the aircraft's sensors detected a touchdown, therefore restricting auto TOGA and that the pilots, being drilled to trust the flight systems weren't able to override quickly enough to spool up before impact.

Not entirely clear what he thought should be done in future.....

[MarkR]

Originally Posted by Kent Broadhead

His theory is that the aircraft's sensors detected a touchdown, therefore restricting auto TOGA and that the pilots, being drilled to trust the flight systems weren't able to override quickly enough to spool up before impact.

Not entirely clear what he thought should be done in future.....

I thought it was very clear, pilots need to be trained for scenarios where computers can be fooled and not use them if there is a doubt, ie if you touch the runway don't hit TOGA and expect the aircraft to manage the throttle, go manual.

[MarkR]

Interesting reading from flight.org somewhat elaborating on training for such scenarios:

While it’s far too early to determine the exact cause of EK521 ‘s demise, it’s perhaps germane to re-visit a topic that I wrote about in our Procedures and Techniques document quite some time ago – the Rejected Landing. As a reminder, the text of that entry into my tome is below, along with Boeing’s paragraph from the FCTM.

The Boeing text on this fairly unique maneuver is short and bland, and it provides little guidance. In no way does it hint at the hands and feet going everywhere this exercise can become when it’s taught to pilots during their initial simulator training onto the aircraft type. For this reason, when introducing the exercise to new crew transferring onto the 777, I’ll always ensure that each trainee has at least two goes at it: one to make the mistakes, one to learn and apply the lessons… and sometimes a third to turn it into a maneuver that holds no mystery and less challenge. That’s both the beauty and the trap of the simulator. It’s actually quite a challenge to introduce this maneuver into a simulated training environment in such a way that the sequence takes the pilots under training by surprise. However, you’re not really trying to do that in transition training anyway; the lesson plan in full is pre-briefed and the techniques and procedures that will be used in response to pre-programmed events are discussed at length so that everyone involved can get the most from their time in this expensive device.

Read more:http://www.flight.org/the-b777-rejected-landing

[MarkR]

Flight Global has some more info on the investigation:

The crew opted to execute a go-around and the aircraft became airborne 4s after the warning.

Its flaps started to retract to the ‘20’ position – the normal go-around setting – some 4s after that, and the landing-gear lever was activated 2s later.

Crucially, the inquiry does not mention whether the take-off/go-around switch, normally used to command go-around thrust from the engines, was activated.

But the investigators point out that these switches on the 777 are inhibited once the aircraft’s landing-gear touches down. In this situation, the crew must manually advance the thrust levers to command go-around power.

The inquiry indicates that the Emirates aircraft was still operating with idle thrust, and decelerating, as it attempted to climb away.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...around-429061/

[Grahame Hutchison]

Here is the link to the Preliminary Report by the General Civil Aviation Authority.

Apparently the aircraft remained at idle thrust for 12 seconds after the Go Around was called.

During the final approach, the headwind turned to an 8kts tail wind component that then increased to 16kts.

Aural cockpit messages were "LONG LANDING, LONG LANDING" followed by "DON'T SINK, DON'T SINK".

If TO/GA is activated before touchdown it remains activated and the Go Around continues. On touchdown the TO/GA is deactivated and requires manual Go Around power to be applied ("The F/D go around mode will not be available until go around is selected after becoming airborne").

I was surprised by the number of Emergency Slide problems, mainly caused by the wind lifting them back up and covering the doorway. A couple of doors had smoke/fire outside and were not opened, and slide another did not touch the ground.

Also interesting to note :- "Full control of the fire was achieved approximately 16 hours after the impact".