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  #61  
Old 24th April 2009, 11:25 AM
NickN NickN is offline
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Chris thank you!

This has always been one of those things I have wanted to understand. Many thanks to yourself and Owen.
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  #62  
Old 24th April 2009, 12:10 PM
Owen H Owen H is offline
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Philip, the second. Company policy augmented by Captain's discretion for operational reasons.

P.S Nick, the TSMP is by far and away the most difficult piece of equimpent installed on a 767! It looks easy, but takes a while to get your head fully around it. You are correct that the 1 represents CLB 1, and the CLB is full rating climb. The order of actually pressing them is an entirely other matter, and can't really be explained simply.
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  #63  
Old 24th April 2009, 01:55 PM
NickN NickN is offline
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That's ok Owen you have done brilliantly explaining things already! Thank you.
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  #64  
Old 24th April 2009, 05:59 PM
Radi K Radi K is offline
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anyone got a pic?
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  #65  
Old 26th April 2009, 12:46 AM
Kieran Wells Kieran Wells is offline
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From http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/...014090,00.html

Quote:
THE pilot of the Emirates flight that nearly crashed at Melbourne Airport with 225 passengers on board had almost no sleep the previous day and was following the airline's orders to take off at reduced power to save money on fuel.

Several sources told the Sunday Herald Sun that Emirates - like many modern airlines - ordered its pilots to take off at reduced thrust when possible to cut fuel costs, emissions and wear on the aircraft.

The thrust or power settings are determined by factors such as aircraft weight, weather conditions, the surrounding terrain and runway length.

But an Emirates source said the March 20 flight - EK407 to Dubai - was set at the "absolute minimum" thrust, leaving little room for error.

"There was no margin for error," the source said.

"This is all about the money."

Emirates yesterday issued a statement saying safety was a top priority for the airline.

"Safety is at the forefront of all operations within the Emirates group," a spokeswoman said.

Sources said a report due on Thursday was expected to show the near-catastrophic accident happened after the incorrect weight was typed into the plane's computers, causing it to set an inadequate take-off speed.

Air safety investigators are examining Emirates' staff records, including the work rosters of some of its pilots, to see if there are systemic safety problems within the airline that could have contributed to the near disaster.

The Sunday Herald Sun learned that the pilot of the plane was also almost at the threshold of the number of hours he was legally able to fly.

Emirates pilots are permitted to fly a maximum 100 hours each 28 days.

Investigators are examining whether pilot fatigue was a factor after being told the pilot had barely slept the day before the flight.

Several sources confirmed that Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators were also looking at whether any other "human factors" needed to be addressed.

The inspection of Emirates' records is part of the bureau's investigation - expected to take up to a year - into the reasons behind the error.

The inquiry will investigate issues such as cockpit distractions and crew resource management.

A source said it was not possible for one person alone to commit the error.

"It happens because a range of things come together at the right time," the source said.

An Emirates source said the airline was in a risky situation because it did not have a culture that encouraged people to voice their safety concerns.

The source said some Emirates pilots were badly fatigued, but people were afraid to speak out.

"There is a limit to how far you can push people," the source said. "Those long-haul flights are really, really fatiguing and demanding.

"But a punitive culture means people are too afraid to speak out.

"Two things, (flight safety and the punitive culture) in my view, that do not match in 2009 and in a major airline.

"A very bad cocktail."

It can also be revealed that:

THE tail crashed into the runway with such force that passengers heard a loud scraping noise and some saw a heavy shower of sparks.

THE impact ripped a hole in the fuselage, causing what appeared to be smoke and dust to swirl into the cabin.

THE pilot made three announcements during the next 35 minutes as he circled Port Phillip Bay to dump fuel before returning to land.

NONE of the announcements told passengers how serious the situation was and the passengers were not in the "brace position" when the plane landed.

THE weight error was made before the plane left the departure gate.

PASSENGERS, including Anita and Ray Chappel, escaped uninjured after the plane landed safely.

The two pilots involved in the accident were forced to resign 48 hours after they were flown back to Dubai.

Safety Bureau and Civil Aviation Safety Authority officials are thought to be concerned about the action taken against the pilots, but have no jurisdiction to intervene.

Emirates pilots, using false names, have flooded the internet to express their concern about rostering, fatigue and the action taken against the two pilots.

The men are expatriates and at least one has since returned to his home country.

The United Arab Emirates does not allow unions, so more than 2000 Emirates pilots employed worldwide are not covered by a union.

Investigations by the Sunday Herald Sun further revealed the pilot was no stranger to the runways at Tullamarine, flying into Melbourne for almost five years, about once every two months.

The pilots - two operating pilots and two augmenting pilots - and 14 crew members returned to their hotel in Melbourne immediately after the accident.

The next day, bureau investigators came to the hotel to conduct interviews.

The man leading the inquiry is investigator Paul Ballard.

Emirates is sending some of its senior managers to Australia to handle the fall-out from Thursday's release of the preliminary report.

Andrew Parker, an Australian now based in Dubai as Emirates' senior vice-president of public, government and environmental affairs, will arrive in Australia this week with Capt Alan Stealey, Emirates' divisional senior vice-president of flight operations.

Emirates declined to comment on the March 20 accident because of the bureau's investigation.

But the company said it had continuously reached international safety standards and had been a founding member of the Gulf Flight Safety Committee - a Middle East aviation body.

The company denied it had a punitive culture that discouraged open discussion about safety concerns.

"Emirates has a positive and open safety reporting culture that helps management understand safety issues before they become significant concerns," a spokeswoman said.

The company would not answer direct questions about reduced-thrust take-offs, the fate of the pilots and the future of the damaged aircraft.
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  #66  
Old 26th April 2009, 08:55 PM
D Chan D Chan is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Kieran Wells View Post
As a person who works in the industry I have seen some of the reporting by the Telegraph and I'd dare say their reporting in airline safety have not been always factually correct. I would urge anyone who read the article take it with a grain of salt and don't base it as solid hard facts.

There could be a whole host of reasons why the crew barely slept in the previous day (if this was factually correct). It could be do with jet lag (circadian rhythm), pattern, hours, their activities in Melbourne during the layover, the hotel accomodation etc.

The punitive culture aspect is scary because if there were systemic issues in EK involved and the crew were treated as such for an honest mistake, who in future would dare to report/raise the issues with their seniors in EK?

Last edited by D Chan; 26th April 2009 at 09:02 PM.
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  #67  
Old 27th April 2009, 10:25 AM
NickN NickN is offline
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Personally I haven't heard any other incidents involving EK in a long time. No to say their hasn't been any but I never hear them. If there is a systemic problem they must cover it up well.
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  #68  
Old 27th April 2009, 10:56 AM
Matt_L Matt_L is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by D Chan View Post
As a person who works in the industry I have seen some of the reporting by the Telegraph and I'd dare say their reporting in airline safety have not been always factually correct. I would urge anyone who read the article take it with a grain of salt and don't base it as solid hard facts.

There could be a whole host of reasons why the crew barely slept in the previous day (if this was factually correct). It could be do with jet lag (circadian rhythm), pattern, hours, their activities in Melbourne during the layover, the hotel accomodation etc.

The punitive culture aspect is scary because if there were systemic issues in EK involved and the crew were treated as such for an honest mistake, who in future would dare to report/raise the issues with their seniors in EK?
This is very true- The issue of fatigue has been evidenced before in Qantas and many airlines on long haul flying and is not an isolated problem with Emirates. Some would remember the Korean Air 743 crash in Guam on approach in 1997- the Captain was severly fatigued and this was a contributing factor.

You would just hope in Melbourne on Thursday the ATSB and whoever else from the regulatory bodies (CASA etc) that is there will present the truth and whole facts to the media and in the report released to the public.

It will no doubt be an interesting read and if there are recommendations made by the report hopefully some pressure will be put on EK to make these changes albeit it massive ones if it is in the culture as the news limited report says.

Also- I think the fact that Emirates is sending those senior execs is almost a pre emptive action ( if what the article says is true) and they are clearly worried by the implications of this report being released and they have very good reason too even with what we know so far
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  #69  
Old 28th April 2009, 08:34 AM
Jason H Jason H is offline
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There was a similar article in the Herald yesterday, and it mentioned that the pilots were forced to resign when they got back to Dubai. Must have been significant pilot error involved.

http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-...0427-ajtb.html
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  #70  
Old 28th April 2009, 08:58 AM
Chris Griffiths Chris Griffiths is offline
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Jason H View Post
Must have been significant pilot error involved.
Or a serious culture of denial within the management of Emirates.
Is there a systemic procedures issue at EK?
How many other airlines have had 3 serious tail strike incidents in only a few years?
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