#11
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Reverse Thrust
The ATSB found that had reverse thrust been used the QF1 overrun would not have occurred. I agree there were many factors but the then-practised avoidance of reverse thrust was identified as the key factor that led to its lack of use even when required.
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Philip |
#12
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You don't think the CRM issue was just a big of a key factor? After all, that started the chain of events.
Last edited by Mick F; 1st January 2013 at 08:10 PM. |
#13
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The key factor was failure to use reverse thrust
My phrase was "key factor" in relation to the overrun. I agreed there were many factors at play, but failure to identify during briefing the potential need for reverse thrust, and then failure to deploy reverse thrust, were key. The ATSB report supports that view.
The post-overrun issues from Bangkok are not relevent to the Moscow crash. My reason for comparing Moscow to Bangkok was that the loss of tyre grip through snow or excess water puts the focus onto the use of reverse thrust. I believe the allusion to be valid. [Above comments made in relation to the pre-edited version of Mick's last contribution!]
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Philip |
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